Disaster Disinformation Operations

Information operations have been used to shape sentiment, drive behavior, and even restructure adversary governments by influencing elections. From brazenly false narratives to nuanced intentional misinterpretations of established facts, the sophistication shown by state actors in the information domain has increased rapidly, especially since these efforts were deployed to profound effect during the COVID-19 pandemic. More than a decade on from foreign meddling in the Brexit and U.S. presidential election of 2016, a new “field of confrontation” appears to have emerged in the information domain: Natural disasters.

Although there is a robust history to misinformation in natural disasters, disinformation (which requires intentionality) has been more limited, particularly the weaponization of it by state actors. Early efforts began to appear shortly after the 2016 elections, with ham-fisted efforts around the 2017 hurricane season. Yet, that was the start of a process that showed considerable increases in maturity following the pandemic. By 2023, disaster disinformation was far more powerful, with the material swirling around the Lahaina wildfire the start of a trend that has persisted through the present.

Disaster disinformation represents the opening of a new front in the information domain. As stimulating events and disinformation hooks, natural disasters are both useful and readily available. That said, disaster disinformation is similar to other disinformation hooks in one important way: The target population matters more than the actor. This article uses the development of a new database showing cases of weaponized disaster information to show how the threat is growing – and as a foundation for early action to prevent its further growth.

Definitions

Disaster disinformation operations involve the specific and intentional deployment of disinformation content by state actors or proxies against their adversaries during or after a natural disaster in order to mislead, confuse, or otherwise impair the target population. This definition is based on the component definitions of both “natural disaster” and “disinformation.”

According to the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR), natural disaster is “a serious disruption of a community or a society at any scale due to hazardous events interacting with conditions of exposure, vulnerability and capacity, leading to one or more of the following: human, material, economic and environmental losses and impacts.” An earthquake, hurricane, or volcanic eruption is not a natural disaster without an accompanying societal impact.

Disinformation false or untrue information “shared with the intent to mislead people [emphasis in the original].” Unlike misinformation, which is unintentional, and , which involves the “deliberate publication of private information for personal or private interest, as well as the deliberate manipulation of genuine content,” disinformation is created and distributed with the aim of affecting a group of people. And when used by a state actor, it can be weaponized.

Disaster disinformation, then, is the direction of intentionally created false or misleading content toward the victims of natural disasters in order to create confusion, anxiety, and discomfort in an effort to undermine government and societal institutions. This study takes an even more focused view, specifically contemplating the weaponization of disaster disinformation.

Historical data set

No dedicated database of disaster disinformation exists, particularly with regard to weaponization by state actors. The EM-DAT database of natural disasters is so broad in its coverage of natural disasters that isolating cases that may have a disinformation component is a difficult task. Specialist disinformation databases (e.g., EU vs Disinfo) are inconsistent in covering natural disasters. Moreover, most discussions of disaster disinformation tend to be broad enough to account for a wide range of actors and sources. Conspiracy theories and organically arising disinformation have proved to be relatively common, but to see disinformation weaponized by an adversary is far rarer. Recent activity suggests that the problem of weaponization could grow, making research necessary.

To fill this gap in the literature, I conducted a review of the literature on disaster disinformation operations and used the events arising from that to populate the data set – an effort that would benefit from future research both add any cases that may have been overlooked and to reach back further historically. This study focuses on the period spanning 2016-2025 and has yielded 11 clear cases of weaponized disinformation. The start date was chosen because it was the first hurricane season after the 2016 U.S. presidential election, which makes for a useful bounding condition and contextual factor with regard to the trajectory of foreign influence operations conducted in and against the United States.

Table 1: Historical Natural Disasters Featuring Weaponized Disinformation

The distribution of cases in Table 1 is a bit lumpy. The United States is by far the most frequently targeted country, representing five of the 11 events, with Moldova and Türkiye next at two each. There are several reasons for this counterintuitive outcome. Although there are many large countries with natural disaster exposure – including China, India, and Japan – the frequency of attacks, underlying political conditions, and nature of adversarial relationships do not necessarily favor active engagement via disinformation. The United States is open enough to make disinformation easy and polarized enough to ensure there are willing audiences to receive it (i.e., the demand function mentioned earlier).

Case characteristics

Of the 11 events featured, nine are straightforward cases of a victim state’s adversaries conducting disinformation operations. The five U.S. cases (and the one in Poland) generally offer little in the way of nuance. U.S. adversaries simply pumped disinformation into populations affected by natural disasters. The one exception is the 2023 Lahaina wildfire event. It occurred in a state not connected to the U.S. mainland, with a different ethnic composition, and having experienced a history of colonization that has had an effect on the local population. This theme is relevant throughout the data in Table 1.

What became evident in Hawaii was even more prominent in the two cases occurring in Moldova (2022 and 2023). A former Soviet republic, Moldova also has underlying tension among ethnic and social groups (e.g., Gagauzia), factions that do not trust the government in Chisinau, and even some Russo-nostalgia. There was a similar issue in both Turkish events, as well, with regionally-focused ethnic minorities feeling marginalized (or even victimized) by the central government.

The events in Türkiye share similarities with the one in Brazil. In both Türkiye and Brazil, disaster disinformation manifested as truly domestic affairs, with both the actor, audience, and adversary all within their borders. This occurs especially when there are ethnic groups marginalized or intense political rivalries in authoritarian or anocratic environments. As with Hawaii and Moldova, there is the breakdown of trust between some parts of the country and the central government; in these instances, though, that breakdown was internal.

Russia, of course, remains the most prominent and ostensibly competent actor in the disinformation space. China follows, having pivoted from the use of disinformation and misinformation for reputation management to offensive and more aggressive applications, particularly through COVID-19 and into the 2023 Lahaina wildfire in Hawaii. And while Belarus may have been an actor of opportunity or convenience (targeting Poland alongside Russia after the 2024 floods from Storm Boris), Iran’s engagement is troubling (particularly given the rise in competence shown during the 2026 conflict with the United States). For Cuba, the development is fascinating, particularly given the Cuban-American population in Florida and the frequency with which they experience hurricanes.

Demand and preexisting grievances

A lumpy data set that is skewed with recency – all but one of the events go from 2021-2025 – might not seem terribly useful at first glance. There are a handful of victim states, a handful of state actors, and a wide range of perils. Victims range from small (Moldova) to large (United States) and span both inter-state and intra-state disinformation campaigns. However, there is one common thread throughout all of them: The interplay of demand for disinformation and preexisting grievances.

The success of disinformation campaigns, in general, should be seen first as a function of demand, and demand for disinformation is related to grievance. Preexisting grievances should be considered the source of demand for disinformation. Demand must spring from something; it does not simply manifest without cause. It comes down to a simple question: Does the target audience for disinformation want it? If they do, then they will naturally compensate for a lack of sophistication, using argument, assumption, and expressions of faith to fill the gaps left by suppliers.

Where demand is high, room for successful disinformation operations exists whether the supply is sophisticated or not. The belief that deepfakes and high-quality narratives can get so good as to be broadly convincing is limited. However, the notion that someone will believe something potentially outlandish because it validates their worldview, assuages their grievances, or gives them someone to blame is far more realistic. I’m more likely to believe you if you don’t have to convince me.

The grievances that feature in Table 1 vary across the victim states. In the United States (aside from Hawaii), there’s an entanglement of political ideology, expectations of government response, and the ability to blame unrelated stakeholders – from immigrants to Israel to Ukraine. In Hawaii, the issues turn cultural and ethnic, and those factors manifest in even more extreme fashion in Moldova and Türkiye. Grievances are foundational to the potential success of disaster disinformation campaigns, and those grievances are linked directly to demand for disinformation.

And we need to start approaching the problem that way.

The importance of looking inward

Efforts to diagnose disinformation vulnerability have tended to focus on the actor. It’s easy to marvel at Russia’s skill in this domain, China’s recent ascent as a major player, and the ability to turn digital operations into physical-world action, including the infamous New York hot dog offer. The fact that adversaries are committing more time, effort, and resources to the disinformation mission is certainly alarming. It shows an interest in disrupting U.S. society in new ways that are difficult to counter. To focus on the adversary, though, is to overlook where the real vulnerability lies.

Remember: Disinformation is a demand problem, even though the security focus seems to remain fixated on supply. And demand is linked to grievances, which means that the best way to fight disaster disinformation operations is to focus on the grievances in disaster-prone regions. This is not to downplay the importance of digital literacy, fact-checking, and other counter-disinformation strategies. The truth matters, and it is important to push back on what is false. However, taking the high road here may also mean taking the scenic route. To achieve immediate results, the most effective way to counter foreign disinformation operations is to address grievances at home.

The most effective way to fight disaster disinformation operations is to deny adversaries access to the information space. Mitigating grievance may mean focusing on preexisting problems unrelated to the threat of natural disaster, such as income inequality and uneven access to state support and societal opportunity. That is a massive challenge that stretches beyond the scope of this study, but there are elements that are addressable on a more limited basis. With regard to mitigating the risk of disaster disinformation, several relevant steps are possible, starting with a review of disaster response plans to ensure that there are no gaps, unintentional biases, or other measures that could result in event response that could favor a particular social, ethnic or income group.

Additionally, grievance and the perception of grievance can be mitigated through transparency of response and engagement. Showing the work being done can make it more difficult for foreign actors to claim that government support has been insufficient or simply not present. Following Hurricane Helene, significant steps were taken to show that resources were being brought to the community, which was helpful in countering the claims that money was being diverted to immigrants or Ukraine. This is less about fact-checking and more about making it harder for adversaries to target the information environment.

The best defense against disaster disinformation is denial of adversary access to sentiment. While that is certainly more difficult than traditional physical defenses to natural disasters, the benefits stretch beyond disinformation to a more secure society.