The speed of Ukrainian counter-messaging and will to fight has rendered Russian psychological operations in Ukraine ineffective. However, throughout the Middle East, Russia has successfully used information operations to frame the Israel-Palestine conflict as evidence of American foreign policy failure while simultaneously diverting international attention from its war in Ukraine. Through state-backed media, social media manipulation, and coordinated disinformation campaigns, Russia amplifies narratives that portray the United States as destabilizing the region, weakening support for Western partners, and strengthening Russian influence among regional audiences.
While Ukraine continues to face Russian aggression in Eastern Europe, the effects of Russian overreach extend far beyond the region. Since the 2014 annexation of Crimea, Russia has increasingly relied on information warfare as a key foreign policy instrument, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Examining Russian psychological operations in Palestine illustrates a broader strategy aimed at destabilizing the region while advancing a sustained disinformation campaign against the West. This strategy extends beyond the digital sphere, as demonstrated on October 29, 2024, when Makhachkala Airport was overtaken by an antisemitic mob following Telegram rumors of Israeli refugees arriving, underscoring how quickly manipulated information can translate into real-world mobilization.
These dynamics are reinforced through narrative framing and coordinated campaigns. President Putin has linked the Israel-Palestine conflict directly to Russia’s “Special Military Operation,” framing it as part of a broader struggle against Western actors. At the same time, Russia has expanded its information operations within Israel, including the use of the Doppelganger campaign. Taken together, these strategies reflect the deliberate use of psychological warfare to deepen division, amplify antisemitic narratives, and frame the conflict as a failure of U.S. policy. The result is an increasingly polarized information environment that distances adversaries and weakens alternative sources of support for the vulnerable populations on the ground. Russian psychological operations in the MENA region are effective not because they create entirely new grievances, but because they strategically exploit existing distrust of Western intervention, allowing Moscow to expand regional influence while reframing geopolitical conflicts through narratives favorable to Russian interests.
Russian Psychological Warfare
Psychological operations (PSYOP) are a central component of modern information warfare, aimed at shaping perceptions, influencing behavior, and altering the decision-making processes within target populations. In the Russian context, these operations are not isolated tools, but form part of a broader strategy of “information confrontation” where digital platforms, state media, and covert campaigns are used to manipulate narratives, erode trust, and create strategic ambiguity within adversary populations. Russian psychological operations have increasingly leveraged social media platforms, state-affiliated networks, and proxy networks to extend influence beyond traditional military domains. This often occurs through the manipulation of information via organizations, influential actors (such as politicians and popular figures in a nation), or spies. Rather than focusing solely on persuasion, Russian PSYOPs aim to create confusion, amplify divisions, and erode trust in institutions.
Three predominate tactics have consumed Russian PSYOP campaigns: 1) leaflet bombs 2) pulse-messaging attacks and 3) disinformation campaigns. While Russia utilizes a variety of psychological warfare tools, information campaigns in the MENA region rely most heavily on disinformation networks, state-backed media outlets, and social media amplification. These mechanisms provide Moscow with scalable influence that extends far beyond traditional military instruments.
Russian Information Channels and Strategy in the Middle East
Russia relies on a layered media ecosystem to conduct information operations across the Middle East. Rather than relying exclusively on state media, Moscow utilizes a network of affiliated news organizations, online platforms, and social media channels that allow Russian narratives to circulate across multiple information environments simultaneously. Key components of this ecosystem include RT, Sputnik, the Strategic Culture Foundation, New Eastern Outlook, NewsFront, and SouthFront. Through these outlets, Russia seeks not only to disseminate preferred narratives but also to challenge Western interpretations of regional events and cultivate skepticism toward U.S. foreign policy. Within the Arab world, these efforts are primarily conducted through RT Arabic and Sputnik Arabic, which adapt Russian messaging to regional audiences and ongoing political conflicts.
In May 2007, outreach towards Arab nations began with the launch of RT Arabic. Formerly known as Rusiya Al-Yaum, its launch was followed by two key events that have made it a critical asset to Russia’s informational warfare strategy in the Middle East: the Arab Spring and Russia’s military intervention in Syria in 2015. RT Arabic programs include Panorama, Person, Zoom, Weekly Report, Press Review, Documentaries, and RT Online—all of which are arms of their propaganda machine.
Russia’s success in Syria demonstrates the importance of perceived source credibility in modern information warfare. Through longstanding partnerships with local media organizations and close coordination with the former Assad regime, Russian-backed outlets became embedded within the Syrian information environment. As a result, many Syrians viewed Russian-generated content as more trustworthy than competing domestic or Western sources. This credibility provided Moscow with a strategic advantage, allowing Russian narratives to circulate with less resistance and creating a model later replicated through RT Arabic and Sputnik Arabic across the wider region.
But Russia has also increased its investments in online media targeting the Middle East and North Africa. Social media dominance by RT Arabic allows for the Russian narrative to reach millions. RT Arabic produces more social media content on Twitter (now X) than other news channels, such as BBC Arabic or Al Jazeera. On average, RT Arabic and Sputnik post over 180 Tweets daily. According to the Middle East Institute in March of 2022, the majority of RT Arabic tweets were about “secret biological laboratories developed by the U.S. in Ukraine.” By comparison, Sputnik Arabic focused on spreading a rumor that President Zelensky was hiding in a U.S. embassy in Poland. In addition, Russia has added narratives of the U.S. supporting terrorist organizations such as al-Nusra, a Sunni opposition group to al-Assad in Syria.
While measurement of Russia’s success in the MENA region is still underdeveloped, a survey from 2015 revealed that 18% of people surveyed in Egypt, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the UAE, and Iraq watched RT Arabic at least once. In Iraq, 98% of those who watch RT Arabic weekly said they watched it every day. Forty four percent of Iraq’s population have responded to being daily viewers of RT Arabic. While audience exposure alone does not necessarily translate into persuasion, these viewing patterns suggest that Russian narratives have substantial opportunities to shape how regional audiences interpret international conflicts. The content disseminated through RT Arabic and Sputnik frequently portrays the United States as a destabilizing force in the Middle East while framing Russia as a more reliable partner and defender of regional interests. Given the prevalence of these messages and the high levels of engagement with Russian state-backed media in countries such as Iraq, sustained exposure may reinforce existing skepticism toward U.S. foreign policy and increase receptivity to narratives that shift responsibility for regional instability onto Western actors. In this context, Russian information operations appear less focused on changing deeply held beliefs and more focused on amplifying and validating grievances that already exist within regional audiences.
Russian Goals and Targeting in Palestine
Russia has three primary goals with its informational warfare campaigns in Palestine: the framing of antisemitism, U.S. foreign policy failure, and U.S. overreach of power. Many of these themes appear on Russia-based state-controlled media sources.
With the Israel-Palestine conflict, Russia has sought further polarization in the region to achieve Russian interests. Part of this campaign has sought to distance American Jews from the Democratic party while also bringing Jerusalem closer to Russia. The previously mentioned Doppelganger campaign sought to stir violence between groups in Israel.
Russia frames the conflict in Gaza as a failure of U.S. involvement and foreign policy. As part of the narrative framed on RT Arabic and Sputnik, the U.S. and its allies are blamed for the instability in the Middle East. This narrative is solidified by previous resentment of the West for overreaches during the War on Terror and continued actions that bring to question U.S. interests in the Middle East. Russia’s strategy is part of an overall goal to weaken the United States on the continent and reduce positive perceptions of NATO, all the while strengthening Russian influence in the region. From Russia’s perspective, increased polarization within Israeli’s society creates strategic opportunities by distracting regional actors and weakening political cohesion among U.S. partners.
Recent military cooperation between Israel and the United States against Iranian targets creates an important complication for Russia’s information strategy. While Russian narratives continue to portray Washington as an unreliable or destabilizing actor, the conflict with Iran has simultaneously strengthened security coordination between the United States and Israel. Rather than undermining the partnership directly, Russian information campaigns increasingly focus on portraying U.S. regional engagement as escalating instability and explaining conflict. In this way, Mosco adapts its messaging to exploit its broader regional concerns about war and intervention, even when U.S.-Israeli cooperation remains strong.
How is it consequential?
Russia’s use of information warfare should be understood as a strategic offensive strategy designed to shape perceptions, constrain adversary responses, and create advantages beyond the battlefield. By limiting freedom of communication domestically and within the military, counterstrategies to combating Russian psychological operations are unlikely. Given this, the effectiveness of Russian psychological operations is based on whether the flow of information is limited in the target country. Given what has been seen in Syria as well as the response to RT Arabic, it is unlikely Russia’s narrative control will be hindered. The ability to rely on native local sources would be ideal; however, there is a low possibility of this given that ideological and polarized information sources are as accessible, if not more so, than moderate alternatives at the local level.
Russia’s negative framing of U.S. interests demonstrates a strategic misdirect that has foreign policy implications for how the United States engages with the Israel-Palestine conflict. The divisive narrative creates bilateral resentment, not only between adversaries in the conflict but also in terms of U.S. willingness to provide aid and military support. Given the continued use of proxy dynamics between Russia and the United States, the Israel-Palestine conflict risks becoming increasingly entangled in broader geopolitical competition, potentially resulting in greater external involvement and further complicating efforts to de-escalate the conflict. Although recent military cooperation between Israela and the United States against Iran has reinforced bilateral security ties, Russian information campaigns continue to frame American involvement as evidence of regional overreach and escalating instability.
Along with these difficulties, Russia seems to continually shift favorability between Jerusalem and other non-state actors in the region. These shifts are attempts to undermine social cohesion and trust in public institutions as seen from the Doppelganger campaign. Russia has repeatedly indicated its indirect support of Hamas. Putin has never referred to Hamas as a terrorist group and condemned Israel’s airstrikes on Gaza. Even recently, Russia invited Hamas leaders to Moscow to work towards serving as a mediator in the Middle East for this ongoing conflict. Part of this relationship is driven by a shared actor who is preventing each from achieving their political goals in Israel and Ukraine—the United States. In October 2022, Palestinian Authority President Abbas expressed distrust of U.S. involvement in the region while stating that he was satisfied with Russia’s position toward the Palestinian issue.
Russia’s PSYOP is Deeply Entrenched
Three key conclusions can be drawn from Russia’s psychological and informational warfare tactics in the Middle East. First, Russia’s increasing reliance on digital platforms has significantly expanded the reach and frequency of their information operations, allowing Russian narratives to circulate rapidly and at scale across the region. Second, Russia’s messaging is effective not simply because of volume alone, but because it strategically exploits pre-exiting grievances toward Western intervention. These underlying sentiments create a receptive audience, making regional populations more susceptible to narratives that frame the United States and its allies as destabilizing forces. Third, beyond amplification and receptivity, Russia’s information strategy is defined by deliberate narrative construction. By framing the conflict through themes of antisemitism, U.S. foreign policy failure, and Western overreach, Russian messaging actively reshapes how audiences interpret conflict dynamics and assign blame.
Taken together, these dynamics suggest that Russian psychological operations in the Middle East are not only persistent but adaptive, leveraging both technological infrastructure and regional political context to sustain influence. As the information environment in the region becomes increasingly fragmented and polarized, the effectiveness of this campaign will depend less on message dissemination and more on their ability to be embedded within existing belief systems and grievances. This raises broader implications for policymakers and analysts, as countering Russian influence will require not only disrupting dissemination channels, but also addressing the underlying conditions that make such narratives persuasive.
Dr. Autumn Perkey (Ph.D., University of Maryland, College Park) is an Assistant Professor in the School of Politics, Security, and International Affairs. Her work focuses on the intersection between foreign policy and cyber/psychological warfare. She has previously worked on research for the Applied Research Laboratory for Intelligence and Security, the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, and the RAND Corporation.
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, the Department of the Army, the Department of War, or the United States Government.
Main image is a woman reading at the Nasir-ol-molk mosque in Iran, taken from Wikimedia Commons.
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