Editor's Note: This article reflects the views of its author, a Ukrainian Member of Parliament. Given his unique position and perspective, we believe his views offer a valuable contribution to ongoing discussions about the conflict and merit consideration by our readers.
NATO has yet to fully recognize that the strategic paradigm of the Cold War is no longer sufficient for the security environment it now faces. The alliance cannot meet the demands of modern warfare while relying on legacy assumptions, force structures, and deterrence concepts designed for a fundamentally different era. Adapting to today’s global reality requires not simply modernizing existing capabilities, but rethinking the foundations of how NATO organizes, equips, and prepares for conflict.
Since 2022, NATO’s policy can be broadly divided into two eras: the “Biden era” and the “Trump era.” The Biden era was characterized by an attempt to “stop the bleeding.” Adherence to an increasingly elusive status quo was the primary objective, with Biden stating that the U.S. will support Ukraine “as long as it takes” to win the war. Support to Ukraine was provided through existing, often outdated weapons and training of Ukrainian military personnel. However, this support was provided without a fundamental reassessment of the changes unfolding on the Ukrainian battlefield.
Conversely, the later Trump presidency changed this premise by introducing a different logic: shifting a greater share of defense spending to European allies while preserving U.S. nuclear dominance and leaving the existing structure of defense spending largely intact. At first glance, this may appear to represent a step forward; in practice, however, it carries serious risks and limitations.
Although both the Biden and Trump eras pushed NATO to adapt to a rapidly changing security environment, neither fully addressed the deeper transformation required by modern warfare. Preserving the status quo through legacy capabilities, higher defense spending, and nuclear deterrence is no longer sufficient. NATO must move beyond modernization and fundamentally transform its force structure, procurement, doctrine, and approach to technological innovation in order to prepare not only for the wars of today, but for the battlefield of tomorrow.
The Trump Era Pillars and Their Efficacy
From the Ukrainian perspective, the Trump-era approach rests on two central premises, each of which deserves closer scrutiny:
First, events in recent years show that the existence of a nuclear umbrella does not prevent the outbreak and escalation of conventional warfare. Even when aimed directly at a member of the nuclear club, states use creative and modern methods to maintain conflict below the threshold of nuclear war. This includes when strikes occur on one’s own territory—such as in regions of Russia or at U.S. military bases in the Persian Gulf. These escalations have yet to serve as grounds for the use of nuclear weapons. Paradoxically, the very fact of possessing nuclear weapons psychologically weakens such a possessor, who becomes overreliant upon their nuclear deterrent at the detriment of their conventional force capability, prioritizing funding for maintaining the nuclear component over the development of conventional armed forces. A striking example of this is the relentless desire of Poland and the Baltic states to host a U.S. nuclear arsenal on their territory, despite the utility of such an arsenal in decreasing Russian aggression being doubtful, if not contradictory.
Second, there is a prevailing assumption that the problem among NATO countries in the defense sector lies exclusively in the level of funding. All recent discussions and disputes within NATO are based on this premise—who is contributing enough and who is falling short. It was precisely this issue that formed the basis of the most recent NATO summits in The Hague and Ankara, which focused on the increase in defense spending to 3.5–5% of GDP. This effectively perpetuates the status quo, replicating the old military infrastructure to address outdated challenges and requirements, and hinders the modernization of military technology. It creates the illusion that defense capabilities are growing, even though in reality they are struggling to maintain pace with battlefield innovations. As was the case with Germany’s Bismarck battleship in World War II, a vast amount of resources were spent on armaments that were not up to the challenge of the times.
This is precisely where major problems arise. Currently, defense spending in the European part of NATO stands at about 2.2% of GDP. In the U.S., it is about 3.01% of GDP. In other words, NATO countries still have a long way to go to reach the target figures. But defense spending and its proposed drastic increase does not happen in a vacuum. These decisions are accompanied by constant political crises and resignations, as was recently the case in London. Or consider the heated debate in the U.S. and the slim chances of passing a proposal to increase defense spending to 1.5 trillion U.S. dollars. This is happening for entirely understandable reasons, since an increase in defense spending must be financed either by cutting social spending or by increasing the budget deficit, which, in turn, will lead to a rise in the debt burden. Let’s also consider proposals to modernize the most costly component of defense: nuclear arsenals. With these challenges, the situation begins to look completely hopeless, leading to a political crisis among NATO countries with planned defense spending targets unachievable and, in fact, illusory.
Are We Asking the Right Questions?
We must ask ourselves: do NATO countries really need a staggering increase in defense spending? Let’s compare. Ukraine spends approximately $84.1 billion annually on defense amid the war. Moscow spends approximately $190 billion. And, as recently acknowledged at the G-7 summit, Ukraine has at least parity on the battlefield despite the significant difference in spending. Meanwhile, the European part of NATO spends about $550 billion annually on defense. This is without a war, without the SAFE (Security Action for Europe) program, and without Ukraine’s budget. In other words, NATO’s spending advantage is more than double. And this is despite the fact that Ukraine is fighting successfully with far less funding. The difference is more staggering in the current U.S.-Iran conflict. The U.S. defense budget stands at $961.6 billion. For Iran, its annual defense spending is estimated at only $7.4 billion (although unofficial estimates suggest spending could reach as much as $25 billion). China’s annual defense spending is estimated at approximately $300–350 billion. Of course, purchasing power varies from country to country, but even these figures demonstrate the significant advantage NATO countries currently hold. The bottom line is that it does not matter how much a country spends, but what you spend on. Either you're fighting an old-style war, or you're preparing for new challenges.
Moreover, NATO countries have an advantage in technology and innovation. Space, the seas, and the air remain firmly in the hands of the Western world. It is extremely difficult to surpass this foundation—provided, of course, that it is actually utilized and made to function effectively. Although China and Russia are eager to catch up—for example, by deploying their own alternative to the Starlink network—the U.S. was still the pioneer in the field of unmanned systems and drones. Consider the MQ-9A Reaper or RQ-4B Global Hawk drones. Or, in fact, the first kamikaze drones in Ukraine—the American Switchblade 300/600.
An Outdated Approach to a Very Modern World
So what’s wrong, then? Rather than spending or capabilities, the main problem is that the defense sector is developing within an outdated framework that took shape as early as the late 20th century. The introduction of innovations in the field of weapons is extremely piecemeal and far too gradual, and is largely limited to the modernization of existing systems already in service with the armed forces. In essence, this is modernization, not transformation.
At the same time, very few fundamentally new types of weapons have appeared over the past 20 years, with rare exceptions such as the MQ-9A Reaper. The dominant role on the battlefield has traditionally been assigned to manned aircraft, aircraft carrier strike groups, and heavy armored vehicles. This concept was entirely justified throughout the Cold War, as virtually everything was built around these systems: personnel training, tactics and strategy for conducting combat operations, maintenance systems, logistics, and the corresponding infrastructure.
However, events on the battlefields in Ukraine and in the waters of the Persian Gulf show that such weapons systems often become irrelevant to current tasks and modern challenges. This does not negate the need to fund and further develop missile systems and, accordingly, air defense systems. However, without the ability to directly project force onto enemy territory—without “boots on the ground”—such systems do not, in and of themselves, become a decisive factor. Achieving this capability without the widespread use of unmanned technologies on the battlefield is becoming increasingly difficult, and in some cases, practically impossible.
At the same time, the development of unmanned technologies is increasingly taking the form of a full-fledged “arms race,” in which fielding only a limited number of units equipped with unmanned systems no longer has a significant impact on the battlefield. A widespread transition to a new range of weapons, in turn, will require a restructuring of virtually the entire infrastructure of the armed forces. This could disrupt existing and long-established weapons procurement programs and, most importantly, will require a reevaluation of the very system for deploying troops on the battlefield and of current technological standards. Such a transition inevitably creates risks of political instability and a temporary decline in the manageability of a country’s defense system. In an effort to avoid these risks, national leaders often choose a simpler and “more media-friendly” path—increasing spending on existing weapons systems, which generates headlines while changing little on the battlefield. One example is the European SAFE program, which, in essence, is primarily focused on funding the production of existing weapon systems rather than on large-scale funding for research and development (R&D).
Transformation, Not Modernization
Is there an alternative to simply increasing spending on existing weapon systems—a path that would simultaneously reduce political risks and significantly enhance the combat effectiveness of NATO member states’ armed forces? Such a path would also open the possibility of a new technological revolution, with potentially positive effects on the economies of alliance member states. Undoubtedly, such a path exists—and it is possible while maintaining current levels of defense spending.
First and foremost, we must accept that, for a certain period, R&D must form the basis of arms procurement policy, which is a serious political challenge.
The process of replacing the existing arsenal with unmanned systems on land, in the air, and at sea must begin as quickly as possible. Everything that can be unmanned must become unmanned: from maritime platforms for protecting waterways to aviation and ground vehicles.
To a certain extent, this can be called the “gamification of war.” Consequently, this completely transforms the battlefield and, above all, the technical requirements for weapons. For example, an unmanned aircraft will place entirely different demands on an aircraft carrier and ground infrastructure, not to mention the requirements for personnel qualifications.
To achieve this, the process must be done in concert with a total revision of military doctrine and the composition of general staffs. Replacing generals in the mold of William Westmoreland (commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam, who employed ineffective tactics of attrition and firepower against the insurgents’ more hybrid and flexible tactics) with those in the mold of Billy Mitchell (a founding father of U.S. military aviation, whose proposal became the cornerstone of the aircraft carrier strike groups' dominance).
Based on Ukraine’s experience, I can attest that it is very difficult for the General Staff to change an established paradigm of combat operations. This is a psychological trait of human nature and, at the same time, the basis for resistance to relevant political decisions. But it is a necessary step toward success. All successful armies have, at some point, been forced to rebuild their command structures during a paradigm shift in warfare. This is an inescapable reality.
In a sense, Ukraine has been “lucky,” as the war has partially done this work for us. The United States was similarly fortunate in 1941, since its prewar forces before Pearl Harbor were small enough that there was little legacy structure to dismantle.
Even today, NATO countries have a significant advantage in many respects. They have industrial and scientific bases with very high potential, which are underutilized due to the vast gap between armed forces stuck in the past and innovative capabilities. It is not impossible, but quite difficult for Ukraine to match this industrial and scientific base. This gives the U.S., France, and Germany time to make difficult political decisions. If such decisions are not made, time will run out.
Going down this path entirely on their own, with each country acting separately, is just as risky. After all, mistakes will undermine any reorganization process, and governments will risk internal turmoil. NATO members can draw on Ukraine’s experience and history of mistakes made along this path to implement changes collectively within the armed forces of NATO countries. This will contain NATO’s expenses at current levels and substantially shorten the time required to reorganize the armed forces.
Naturally, during the reorganization period, the challenges and threats facing NATO countries will not disappear. Here, Ukraine will be able to shoulder some of these challenges, including the deployment of its unmanned systems to share expertise with NATO military personnel, train relevant units, and strengthen security in the Baltic region and the Persian Gulf. The most effective strategy is to integrate U.S. military bases with Ukrainian forces and shared technologies; this will be the key to solving the challenges we face. Implementing such a strategy is only a matter of time.
The cost of these complex decisions can be made more acceptable by establishing technological and defense partnerships for combined, comprehensive defense solutions. This will require a change in the status quo and a reassessment of the relative weight of coalition members. But it is still more advantageous than radically restructuring one’s own security system alone.
Do Western leaders realize the challenges they face? My personal experience at the NATO summit in Ankara showed that yes, they do. But a final decision on the technological development of NATO countries has not yet been reached. For now, it resembles a small child cautiously trying to explore a new world: it is strange and intriguing, but not yet fully understood.
That is why the current trend is to chase after individual technical innovations that were in the headlines yesterday, without realizing that these technological innovations, on their own, solve very little—especially if they will be obsolete in six months.
Steering in the right direction is possible only through firm political decisions. But so far, no such decisions are in sight.
Oleg Dunda is a Ukrainian Member of Parliament and co-chair of the inter-factional parliamentary association “For the Decolonization of Russia” and a member of the Committee on the Organization of State Power. Mr. Dunda is a regular participant in international security forums and NATO summits, and has authored legislative initiatives to counter Russian propaganda efforts within Ukraine and globally.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, the Department of the Army, the Department of War, or the United States Government.
The main image was taken by Marek Studzinski provided on Unsplash.
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