Covert Crypto: a Double-edged Sword for Special Operations
“For covert operations, the misconception that crypto is inherently 'anonymous' is hazardous... Instead, crypto provides the potential for non-attribution or deliberate exposure, depending on the type of operation.” In the current landscape of strategic competition and irregular warfare, the ability to operate covertly in the financial domain
The Limits of Leadership Decapitation: Strategic Consequences of Overreliance on Military Force for Political Transformation
Leer en: Español For more than two decades, U.S. national security policy has repeatedly relied on leadership decapitation as a mechanism for catalyzing systemic change. In practice, this has often meant turning to military force as the primary instrument for resolving problems rooted in political decay, institutional corruption, and
Geoeconomics of Irregular Warfare: Iran and the Global Ripple Effects — Part VI
In Part Six of Irregular Warfare Initiative’s special series examining the unfolding conflict with Iran, Gianni Koskinas (CEO, Hoplite Group), Hamlet Yousef (IWI Economic & Legal Warfare Advisor), and Ed Bogan (Founder, Institute for the Study of States of Exception) analyze how innovation and industrial capacity are reshaping the
Solving the Dilemma: A Leadership Model for Irregular Warfare ('Guerrilla Leader Series' - Part 3 of 3)
“Every intervention begins as a story of liberation. Without adaptation, it ends as a story of occupation.” Why do militarily superior forces consistently win the fight—but lose the peace? This is not a new question. It is the defining paradox of modern irregular warfare. From Vietnam to Afghanistan to
Geoeconomics of Irregular Warfare: Iran and the Global Ripple Effects — Part V
In Part Five of Irregular Warfare Initiative’s special series examining the unfolding conflict with Iran, Hamlet Yousef (IWI Economic & Legal Warfare Advisor), Ioannis Koskinas (CEO, Hoplite Group), Tom Johansmeyer (Co-Director, IWI Economic & Legal Warfare Group), and Ed Bogan (Founder, Institute for the Study of States of
Chokepoints: American Power in the Age of Economic Warfare
Episode 151 of the Irregular Warfare Podcast explores how the United States wields power not only through military force, but through dollars, sanctions, export controls, and supply chains. Anchored in Eddie Fishman’s book Chokepoints: American Power in the Age of Economic Warfare, this episode examines the rise of economic
Commercial Pathways and Proxy Power: How Irregular Forces Acquire Advanced Capabilities
In June 2024 Italian customs officials opened shipping containers labeled "wind turbine parts" bound for Libya. Inside were disassembled components for Chinese Wing Loong II drones—the same systems UN investigators had forensically linked to the January 2020 Tripoli military academy strike that killed twenty-six cadets. Four
Geoeconomics of Irregular Warfare: Iran and the Global Ripple Effects — Part IV
In Part Four of Irregular Warfare Initiative’s special series examining the unfolding conflict with Iran, Hamlet Yousef (National Security Investor/ IWI Economic & Legal Warfare Advisor), Ioannis Koskinas (CEO, Hoplite Group), and Tom Johansmeyer (Co-Director, IWI Economic & Legal Warfare Team) analyze the shifting geoeconomic landscape of the
Claimed or Unclaimed: Patterns of Attribution in Global Terrorism
Editor’s Note: this article is being republished with the permission of Small Wars Journal as part of a republishing arrangement between IWI and SWJ. The original article was published on 02.18.2026 and is available here. Despite extensive research on terrorist violence, far less attention has been paid
The Insurance Weapon: How Commercial Risk Logic Became an Irregular Warfare Tool at Hormuz
Before Iran laid mines in the Strait of Hormuz and before the IRGC began striking tankers with drones, the strait had already been effectively closed. Within 48 hours of coordinated U.S.–Israeli airstrikes on Iran on February 28, 2026, war risk premiums surged fivefold, major marine insurers terminated existing
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