Political Warfare and the Road to Invasion: Irregular Warfare in Ukraine Since 2014
Laura Jones and Kyle Atwell In Episode 56 of the Irregular Warfare Podcast, we conclude our two-part series focused on irregular warfare in Ukraine. In the previous episode, our guests discussed Russia’s conception and employment of irregular warfare in Ukraine from its annexation of Crimea in 2014 to its
Time Is Not On Kyiv's Side: Training, Weapons, And Attrition In Ukraine
Andrew Milburn The battalion commander shrugged helplessly when we advised him that five days was a completely inadequate amount of time in which to train his soldiers. “This is all we have—they are needed on the front,” he replied with grim finality. A few days later, on a separate
Learning the Wrong Lessons: The Blind Spots in the US Approach to Foreign Military Training
This Irregular Warfare Initiative article was originally posted through our partner organization, the Modern War Institute at West Point. Foreign military training has become one of the most popular tools in the US foreign policy tool kit. Between 1999 and 2016, the United States spent almost $15 billion to train
The SOF Truths: A Different Perspective on Security Force Assistance
This Irregular Warfare Initiative article was originally posted through our partner organization, the Modern War Institute at West Point. US special operations forces train, advise, and assist in at least sixty countries every day, preparing allies and partners for conflict. The SOF Truths guide these special operations units; every special
Do Targeted Strikes Work? The Lessons Of Two Decades Of Drone Warfare
This Irregular Warfare Initiative article was originally posted through our partner organization, the Modern War Institute at West Point. One of the most controversial US tools of irregular warfare over the last twenty years has been targeted strikes by remotely piloted aircraft, or drones, against terrorist threats in areas outside
Repacking Pandora’s Box: Managing the Dangers of Weapons Proliferation in Postconflict Ukraine
This Irregular Warfare Initiative article was originally posted through our partner organization, the Modern War Institute at West Point. In the understandable rush to equip Ukraine to defend its sovereignty, the West has flooded the region with all manner of highly destructive and portable weapons. Powerful antitank guided missiles like
Data As A Weapon: Psychological Operations In The Age Of Irregular Information Threats
This Irregular Warfare Initiative article was originally posted through our partner organization, the Modern War Institute at West Point. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is arguably the first war to be documented and fought on social media. At the beginning of the war, Ukraine seized the initiative in the information
Don’t Underestimate the Bear—Russia Is One of the World’s Most Effective Modern Counterinsurgents
This Irregular Warfare Initiative article was originally posted through our partner organization, the Modern War Institute at West Point. The Russian invasion of Ukraine grinds on. So far, Ukrainian conventional forces and resistance groups have mounted a stiff defense against Russia’s numerically superior forces. The Ukrainian people, meanwhile, have
(Don't Fear) Irregular Warfare: Getting IW Right In The Upcoming National Defense Strategy
This Irregular Warfare Initiative article was originally posted through our partner organization, the Modern War Institute at West Point. In the classic Saturday Night Live sketch “More Cowbell,” legendary music producer Bruce Dickinson (played by Christopher Walken) takes on production of the classic rock band Blue Öyster Cult. In the
How the National Guard Can Help Counter Chinese Influence
This Irregular Warfare Initiative article was originally posted through our partner organization, the Modern War Institute at West Point. In 2004, Hurricane Ivan inflicted widespread physical devastation across the Caribbean. In the storm’s aftermath, China quietly began to establish a foothold in the region, making offers that some countries
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