The Future of US Security Force Assistance
This Irregular Warfare Initiative article was originally posted through our partner organization, the Modern War Institute at West Point. The United States has invested heavily in building the military capacity of partner forces in the two decades since 9/11. But these security force assistance (SFA) efforts have had mixed
Managing Violence: Lessons In Irregular Warfare From India
This Irregular Warfare Initiative article was originally posted through our partner organization, the Modern War Institute at West Point. In February 2020, the United States and the Afghan Taliban negotiated a seven-day reduction in violence levels. As part of the deal, the two sides agreed to a series of
The Lessons of Two Decades of War: A Review of IWI’s Inaugural Conference
This Irregular Warfare Initiative article was originally posted through our partner organization, the Modern War Institute at West Point. The Irregular Warfare Initiative’s inaugural conference was conducted on September 10, 2021, and brought together almost nine hundred participants. This conference builds on the mission of IWI—to bridge the
Requiem for the Afghan “Fabergé Egg” Army: Why Did It Crack So Quickly?
This Irregular Warfare Initiative article was originally posted through our partner organization, the Modern War Institute at West Point. Over the course of two decades and at a price tag of over $88 billion, the United States and its NATO partners built a modern and well-equipped Afghan military—one
Learning All the Wrong Lessons: Why an Over-the-Horizon Approach to Counterterrorism Won’t Work
This Irregular Warfare Initiative article was originally posted through our partner organization, the Modern War Institute at West Point. President Joe Biden’s speech in the wake of the US withdrawal from Kabul was intended to put a seal on a painful chapter in the nation’s history. “I was
Lessons From The Philippines: Irregular Warfare In Action
This Irregular Warfare Initiative article was originally posted through our partner organization, the Modern War Institute at West Point. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the world watched as the United States began a punitive expedition to Afghanistan to kill or capture Osama bin Laden, oust the Taliban, and
Out of Africa: The Strategic Mistake of US Disengagement from Somalia
This Irregular Warfare Initiative article was originally posted through our partner organization, the Modern War Institute at West Point. In December 1992, as an infantry platoon commander, I was among the first Marines to land in Mogadishu at the onset of Operation Restore Hope. It was a mission that made
Not Your Grandfather’s Counterinsurgency: The United States Must Prepare for Radically New Forms of Nonstate Violence
This Irregular Warfare Initiative article was originally posted through our partner organization, the Modern War Institute at West Point. Twenty years of costly counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan have left many national security experts—and the American public—ready to move on. However, while the United States may
Will Culture Defeat Strategy? The British Military And Irregular Warfare After Afghanistan And Iraq
This Irregular Warfare Initiative article was originally posted through our partner organization, the Modern War Institute at West Point. In their recent introduction to the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Jacob Shapiro and Patrick Howell propose that a combination of Russian revanchism and China’s increasingly muscular global ambitions provides ample opportunity
Failing To Train: Conventional Forces In Irregular Warfare
This Irregular Warfare Initiative article was originally posted through our partner organization, the Modern War Institute at West Point. A recent election saw a nationalist Estonian party take control of the government. Frustrated by the election outcome and lack of citizenship, the ethnic Russian minority, 20 percent of the population,
Bridging the gap between irregular warfare scholars, practitioners, and policymakers.
